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I. Introduction
Colorado’s Denver-Julesberg Basin, a massive oil and gas play in
Northeastern Colorado, is no stranger to controversy. For the past thirty
years, litigators, judges, mayors, and counties became accustomed to
renditions of the same gladiatorial fight. The old script went something like
this: intrepid, environmentally conscious city imposed a moratorium on oil
and gas operations.1 Not to be intimidated by a shrimp, the bold oil and gas
industry then moved to enjoin the moratorium on the basis that state law
preempted the local law. 2 In each case, the local government perished by
the sword of state law. Despite these outcomes, new local challengers
continued to step into the great Colosseum of the Denver-Julesberg Basin –
almost certain to crumble under the superior might of the state law. Why
then, did counties and cities continue to step into the arena armed only with
the seemingly meager slingshot that is local law? Local entities didn’t
litigate these issues merely to waste resources or appease constituents
apprehensive of fracking. Every good underdog clings to some hope that
victory is within reach.
For these cities and towns, that hope is Article XX of the Colorado
Constitution. Article XX means Colorado is an imperium in imperio state. 3
Imperium in imperio, or an empire within an empire, generally means
Colorado grants chartered cities plenary power to regulate matters of local
concern.4 For much of the early 20th century, the powers conferred to cities
were generally respected.5 In other words, the slingshot wielded by local
entities was, at one point, a formidable bow. However, tides of the courts
are subject to change. In the past half century, the courts began to construe
local powers under Article XX to be less powerful than originally thought. 6
This trend continues today. In regionalism debates collateral to the courts’
decisions, local entities asserting power under Article XX are sometimes
characterized as selfish players wielding power detrimental to the state as a
1. See generally City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 586 (Colo.
2016); City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573 (Colo. 2016); Voss v.
Lundvall Bros., 830 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1992).
2. See generally Fort Collins, 369 P.3d 586; Longmont, 369 P.3d 573; Voss, 830 P.2d
1061.
3. See Jarit C. Polley, Uncertainty for the Energy Industry: A Fractured Look at Home
Rule, 34 ENERGY L.J. 261, 276 (2013).
4. John E. Hayes & Kristy M. Hartl, Home Rule in Colorado: Evolution or Devolution,
33 COLO. LAW. 61, 61 (2004).
5. Id.
6. See id.
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whole.7 The counterargument to these characterizations is that local entities
should be free to govern in a manner tailored to the interests of their
constituents so long as these local regulations do not conflict with the
Constitution or laws of the State.8 So, the thrust of this argument, that local
regulations restricting the development of oil and gas stand so long as they
do not conflict with the Oil and Gas Conservation Act (“OGCA”),
propelled local litigants into the colosseum.
Perhaps the General Assembly became weary of the spectacles of the
colosseum because in 2019, the General Assembly passed, and the
Governor signed into law Senate Bill 19-181 (“The Bill”). 9 The Bill brings
comprehensive reforms to the statutory companion of Article XX and the
OGCA. Prior to The Bill, the OGCA directed the Colorado Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission (“COGCC”) to act in a manner that “foster[ed]”
the industry.10 Now, the COGCC is tasked with regulating the oil and gas
industry “in a manner that protects public health, safety, and welfare,
including protection of the environment and wildlife resources.”11 This
change in ethos is reflected throughout the newly amended OGCA: greater
setbacks are required, forced pooling requirements are more stringent,
membership of the COGCC is now more representative of non-industry
persons, and the surface use rights of land owners are stronger. 12
Of all the changes The Bill brings, the most interesting is its treatment of
local entities. The Bill amends the statutory companion to Article XX – the
Land Use Enabling Act (“LUEA”) 13. Under the newly amended LUEA, the
siting of oil and gas well locations are contemplated as areas of local
interest.14 Significantly, this treatment of wells as areas of local interest
grants county and municipal governments more power to regulate land use
activities as they relate to oil and gas. This designation carries over into the
OGCA which now expressly conditions state approval of drilling permits

7. See id. at 62.
8. See generally City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465 (1893) (noting
that certain municipalities are entitled to imperium in imperio treatment).
9. See S.B. 19-181, 72nd Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019); Judith Kohler,
Gov. Jared Polis Ushers in New Era of Drilling Regulation, but are “Oil and Gas Wars”
Over?, THE DENVER POST (Apr. 17, 2019, 2:48 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/2019/
04/16/colorado-oil-gas-bill-signed-gov-jared-polis/.
10. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(I) (prior to April 16, 2019).
11. S.B. 19-181, 72nd Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019).
12. Id.
13. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 29-20-102 to 107 (2019).
14. Id.
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on well site locations already approved by local governments. 15 And, in a
reversal of the old script, local governments are now authorized to adopt
regulations more restrictive than those imposed by the COGCC.16 The Bill
is silent as to whether or not a local government could adopt regulations
less restrictive than those imposed by the COGCC.17
For the regionalism fights in the Denver-Julesburg Colosseum, The Bill
clearly forecloses the sort of litigation that became commonplace in the last
thirty years. In a sense, The Bill serves as a legislative prosthetic for the
Colorado Supreme Court’s parsimonious treatment of local law under
Article XX. The General Assembly now expressly authorizes, and the
COGCC shall recognize, local regulations more restrictive than those
imposed by the state. When Governor Polis signed The Bill into law, he
hoped it would mark the end of the “oil and gas wars” in Colorado.18
Governor Polis’s hope was misplaced. The newly amended LUEA and
OGCA invites a new combatant to the colosseum – Weld County – the
largest oil and gas producer in the State. 19 Unlike other local entities who
have entered the arena in the past, the constituents of Weld County
generally favor the oil industry. Shortly after the passage of The Bill, Weld
County designated the development of oil and gas as an area of local
interest through the Colorado Areas and Activities of State Interest Act. 20
Pursuant to this designation and the authorities conferred to local
governments by LUEA and Colorado’s home rule county provisions 21,
Weld County developed its own ordinances and the Weld County Oil and
Gas Energy Department (“OGED”) to exercise Weld County’s new siting
authorities. 22 The COGCC takes issue to the creation of OGED and asserts
that while local governments enjoy new authority to regulate oil and gas

15. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-106(1)(f) (2019).
16. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-131 (2019).
17. See id.; § 34-60-106(1)(f).
18. Judith Kohler, Six Months After Colorado’s Sweeping Oil and Gas Law Took Effect,
Fight Over Path Forward Hasn’t Faded, THE DENVER POST (Oct. 24, 2019, 12:42 PM),
https://www.denverpost.com/2019/10/24/colorado-oil-gas-law-6-months-old-sb-181/.
19. Oil and Gas Energy Department, WELD COUNTY, (2020) https://www.weldgov.com/
departments/oil_and_gas_energy.
20. WELD CTY., COLO., CODE ch. 21, art. 1, div. 1, § 21-1-30, https://library.municode.
com/co/weld_county/codes/charter_and_county_code?nodeId=CH21ARACSTIN_ARTIAD
RE_DIV1ININGE (last visited Apr. 7, 2020).
21. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 30-28-101 to 906; WELD CTY., COLO. supra note 20.
22. WELD COUNTY supra note 19.
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under The Bill, this does not divest the COGCC of authority. 23 Weld
County argues the newly amended OGCA and LUEA reserve the authority
to approve surface locations solely to local governments who have
designated oil and gas as an area of local interest.
For now, the COGCC and Weld County are at a truce. The County and
COGCC entered into a Memorandum of Understanding by which the two
parties will coordinate in a timely manner to review applications for the
siting of new oil and gas wells.24 The gates to the colosseum remain open,
however, and the rules of the arena are now different. In the future, courts
will need to decide to what degree a locally created oil and gas department
may exercise control over the industry within its boundaries. Parsed
differently, to what extent does state law preempt local law under the new
OGCA? The issue, considered through the many perplexing lenses of
Colorado preemption case-law, might be realistically resolved in a number
of different ways. Part II of this paper looks to the gritty details of Colorado
preemption jurisprudence and how the OGCA now fits into this scheme.
Colorado is not the only imperium in imperio state. Nor is Colorado the
only imperium in imperio state with a prominent oil and gas presence. Part
III looks to the storied jurisprudence of home rule preemption analysis in
Oklahoma. In part IV, I argue the COGCC may not have its cake and eat it
too – faithful adherence to the acts and case law indicate certain local
regulations of oil and gas are not preempted by state law.
II. Colorado Preemption Law
A. Basis of Local Authority: Types of County and City Governments
Article XX of the Colorado Constitution provides that the “charter and
the ordinances” of a city or town “shall supersede within the territorial
limits and other jurisdiction of said city or town any law of the state in
conflict therewith.”25 Note that Article XX empowers properly chartered

23. Blair Miller, Colorado Oil and Gas Regulators Tell Weld County the COGCC
Maintains Regulatory Authority: Letter Comes After County Oil and Gas Department
Formed, THEDENVERCHANNEL.COM (Jul. 22, 2019, 8:10 PM), https://www.thedenver
channel.com/news/politics/colorado-oil-and-gas-regulators-tell-weld-county-the-cogccmaintains-regulatory-authority.
24. Macie May, COGCC Provides Clarification for Designated Areas of State Special
Interest, LONGMONT OBSERVER (Sept. 10, 2019), https://longmontobserver.org/featured/
cogcc-provides-clarification-for-designated-areas-of-state-special-interest/.
25. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

740

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 5

home rule cities. Thus, two species of city exist in Colorado: local and
home rule.
The Colorado Supreme Court does not automatically construe Article
XX as giving home rule cities and towns unqualified, plenary authority to
govern within their boundaries. 26 Rather, the court will ask if the regulated
issue is “of local, state, or mixed local and statewide concern.”27 For issues
of purely local concern, a home rule city has “plenary authority and is not
inferior in authority to the Colorado General Assembly.”28 Accordingly,
with regards to issues of statewide concern, state laws preempts local
laws.29 When an issue is of both state and local concern, state law preempts
local laws if the local law operationally conflicts with state law. 30
Regulations of statutory cities are not given the same treatment as home
rule cities. For preemption analysis of a statutory city law, the courts will
see if the statutory city has acted validly under the powers delegated to it.
Assuming it has, the court will then turn to see if state law expressly,
impliedly, or operationally conflicts with and preempts the local law. 31
Notably, county governments are not referenced in Article XX. Much
like cities, two species of county exist in Colorado: home rule counties and
statutory counties.32 Article XIV of the Colorado Constitution empowers
counties to provide and exercise “such permissive powers as may be
authorized by statute”.33 Home rule counties are given greater latitude than
statutory counties to make regulations within their boundaries. 34 Thus,
regulations of statutory and home rule counties may be treated differently
for purposes of the Colorado Supreme Court’s preemption analysis. For
cases involving statutory counties, “the ordinary rules of statutory
construction” are applied to “to determine whether a state statute and local
ordinance can be construed harmoniously or whether the state statute
preempts the local ordinance.”35 When the law of a statutory county
conflicts with a specific state law addressing the matter, the court will not
26. See Ryals v. City of Englewood, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1245 (D. Colo. 2013).
27. City of Commerce City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1279 (Colo. 2002).
28. Ryals, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1245.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Joel Minor, Note, Local Government Fracking Regulations: A Colorado Case
Study, 33 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 61, 94 (2014).
32. See Colo. Mining Ass’n. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Summit County, 199 P.3d 718,
724 (Colo. 2009).
33. COLO. CONST. art. XIV, § 16.
34. Id.; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 30-35-102 to 201 (2019); Colo. Mining, 199 P.3d at 723.
35. Colo. Mining, 199 P.3d 718, 724 (Colo. 2009).
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look to see if the issue is one of local, state, or mixed concern. Instead, the
court will look to see if state law expressly preempts the local law or if the
state law is “sufficiently dominant” to override the local interest. 36
Moreover, courts will treat county land use authority as presumptively valid
but, unlike home rule cities, will constrain the authority of statutory
counties to the powers expressly given to them by the General Assembly. 37
Only two true home rule counties, Pitkin County and Weld County, exist
in Colorado.38 Broomfield County and Denver County are home rule
counties to an extent but they differ from true home rule counties due to
their unique status and constitutional provisions. 39 Because home rule
counties are so few, the courts have had little opportunity to determine how
preemption analysis would work between home rule county and state law. 40
One commentator posits the courts will likely use the same analysis used
for statutory counties in preemption analysis for home rule counties. 41 The
basis for this assertion is that home rule counties, unlike home rule cities,
do not possess the same plenary powers. 42 There is ambiguity on the
subject, however, because the Colorado Supreme Court, in dicta, clumped
home rule cities and counties within the same preemption analysis
framework for purposes of land use authority. 43 The Colorado Supreme
Court did not expressly define the rationale behind this treatment. Article
XIV § 16 makes no mention of preemption. 44 It instead empowers home
rule counties to exercise mandatory and permissive powers “as may be
authorized by statute applicable to all home rule counties.” 45 A likely
explanation for this dicta treatment may be that Article XX § 6 provides the
County of Denver, but only the County of Denver, with home rule

36. Id.
37. Minor, supra note 31, at 94.
38. COLO. LEGIS. COUNCIL STAFF, 2013 COLORADO LOCAL GOVERNMENT HANDBOOK 1,
11 (2013), https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/13%20Local%20Gov%20
Handbook%20for%20posting.pdf.
39. Id.
40. Minor, supra note 31, at 95 (“[H]ome rule counties have a more ambiguous legal
status than other Colorado local governments.”).
41. Id. (speculating that “a court would likely apply the same preemption analysis to a
home rule county as a statutory county.”).
42. Id.
43. Colo. Mining Ass’n. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Summit County, 199 P.3d 718, 723
(Colo. 2009).
44. COLO. CONST. art. XIV, § 16.
45. Id.
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powers.46 The Colorado Constitution plainly does not empower all other
home rule counties to the same extent as home rule cities. 47 Therefore,
existing speculation regarding the treatment of home rule counties is likely
correct – home rule counties would be treated in the same manner as
statutory counties or cities. The effect of this, then, is that even home rule
counties, like Weld County, will largely be forced to follow the OGCA and
comply with the rules of the COGCC.
Home rule cities, on the other hand, enjoy greater status under Colorado
preemption law. After The Bill there is a legitimate question as to whether
the COGCC continues to possess full authority over home rule cities that
elect to regulate oil and gas in a manner not conforming with the OGCA. In
particular, how would the courts treat home rule city ordinances that
endeavored to regulate oil and gas outside the confines of state law? The
answer to this question is
found in the perplexing web of Colorado
preemption jurisprudence.
The observations presented herein come with a major caveat. Generally,
the home rule doctrine and state preemption produces very unpredictable
results.48 Unsatisfactorily, this same principle applies for the more niche
area of Colorado home rule preemption jurisprudence. State courts possess
“a wealth of choices” in addressing conflict preemption. 49 Mechanistic
application of preemption doctrine suggests possible outcomes but no
guarantees. Nevertheless, the stakes of home rule preemption litigation are
high – especially for the oil and gas industry. Since the Bill became
effective, approvals for permits to drill declined by about half. 50 Without
the help of Colorado state government, the best hope for operators to
stimulate new drilling may be Colorado preemption doctrine.

46. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.
47. Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, When States’ Legislation and Constitutions Collide with
Angry Locals: Shale Oil and Gas Development and Its Many Masters, 41 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 55, 135 (2016).
48. Jacob Alderdice, Note, Impending Local Laboratories: Obstacles to Urban Policy
Diffusion in Local Government Law, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 459, 464 (2013).
49. Daniel E. Kramer, Colorado Preemption Law, 48 COLO. LAW. 38, 43 (Apr. 2019).
50. Catherine Traywick, Tougher Drilling Rules Can’t Stop Colorado’s Oil Bonanza,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 28, 2020, 3:56 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0228/tougher-drilling-rules-can-t-stop-colorado-s-oil-bonanza.
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B. Overview of Colorado Home Rule Preemption

C. Preemption Analysis for Home Rule Cities
Under home rule city preemption analysis, the court will ask if the issue
is one of local, statewide, or mixed concern. 51 It is clear home rule city laws
supersede a conflicting state statute in matters of local concern. 52 In matters
of statewide or mixed concern, the state law supersedes a conflicting city
law. 53 The classification of whether an issue is of local or statewide concern
51. City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 580 (Colo. 2016).
52. Id. at 579.
53. Id.
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is a legal question.54 Four factors are used to classify the nature of the
matter: “(1) the need for statewide uniformity of regulation, (2) the
extraterritorial impact of the local regulation, (3) whether the state or local
governments have traditionally regulated the matter, and (4) whether the
Colorado Constitution specifically commits the matter to either state or
local regulation.”55 The following sections examine each factor under prior
case law and changes to the OGCA. Although the OGCA may not have
intended to divest the COGCC of regulatory power, the ultimate effect of
the OGCA may be that home-rule municipalities are largely free to
regulate, or not regulate, the oil and gas industry.
1. Factor One, The Need for Statewide Uniformity
Laws demand statewide uniformity when uniformity is necessary to
achieve and maintain state goals and provide “uniform access and
expectations of consistency.”56 The uniformity factor abhors a messy
“patchwork approach” to legislation.57 In Ryals v. City of Englewood, the
City of Englewood – a home rule city – defended the validity of an
ordinance making it unlawful for a registered sex offender to establish a
residence within two thousand feet of schools, playgrounds, bus stops,
pools, recreational trails, and walk-to-school routes.58 This ordinance was
challenged on the basis that state laws directing the Sex Offender
Management Board preempted Englewood’s ordinance. In a certified
question of law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, The Colorado Supreme Court held the uniformity factor weighed in
favor of Englewood. Although the General Assembly characterized state
law as comprehensively evaluating the treatment of adult sex offenders,
state law was silent with regard to residency requirements of sex
offenders.59 Furthermore, the language of the statute contemplated some
role for local governments suggesting that although the General Assembly
intended to effectuate some general uniformity, the statute significantly left
“room for difference in the narrower area of residency regulation.”60

54. Id.
55. Id. at 580.
56. Ryals v. City of Englewood, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1245 (D. Colo. 2013) (quoting
City of Northglenn v. Ibrarra, 62 P.3d 151, 161 (Colo. 2003)).
57. Id.
58. Ryals v. City of Englewood, 364 P.3d 900, 904 (Colo. 2016).
59. Id. at 906–907.
60. Id. at 907.
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The litigants in Ryals settled before the Tenth Circuit could hold on the
matter. However, much can be learned from comparing the Colorado
Supreme Court’s certified answer to the holding of the District Court of
Colorado. The Colorado Supreme Court’s answer to the certified question
differed from the conclusion the District Court of Colorado reached in its
consideration of the ordinance. 61 Uniformity would be subverted, the
District Court concluded, if the comprehensive, best practices of the Sex
Offender Management Board could be disregarded and supplanted by local
law. 62 Whether or not the state law was silent as to residency requirements
was apparently not dispositive to the District Court. 63 The District Court did
not discuss what the Colorado Supreme Court found instructive, that state
law contemplated some room for local ordinances. 64
The differences between the Colorado Supreme Court and District
Court’s treatment of the uniformity factor are illuminating. Contrary to the
District Court’s analysis, the Colorado Supreme Court seemed to conclude
a desire for uniformity could not be evinced from the silence of state law
with regard to residency requirements. Additionally, the Colorado Supreme
Court made special note that the statute envisioned room for local
governance. Two conclusions can be drawn from this. First, the Colorado
Supreme Court will not be quick to construe ambiguities in the state statute
as favoring a need for uniformity. Second, the court will consider special
powers given to local entities as weighing against a legislative desire for
uniformity.
In the context of oil and gas, the Colorado Supreme Court has repeatedly
held the OGCA demands uniform treatment of oil and gas throughout the
state.65 The need for uniformity in oil and gas is twofold: geological
formations do not track political boundaries and the correlative rights of
mineral owners are protected through the efficient and even recovery of
hydrocarbons.66 The new OGCA does not change the geological nature of
subterranean pools of hydrocarbons but it marks a radical shift from a
legislative scheme designed to favor correlative rights to one that defines
waste as: “not includ[ing] the nonproduction of oil or gas from a formation
61. Ryals, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2013).
62. Ryals, 962 F. Supp. 2d. at1246.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 586, 591 (Colo. 2016);
City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 580 (Colo. 2016), 369 P.3d 573
(2016); Voss v. Lundvall Bros., 830 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1992).
66. Longmont, 369 P.3d at 580.
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if necessary to protect public health, safety, and welfare, the environment,
or wildlife resources as determined by the commission.” 67 This choice of
definition consciously chooses to leave mineral interest owners with little
recourse should the nonproduction of oil and gas, as a result of local
legislation, in one part of the reservoir result in a material depletion of their
ability to recover from the reservoir in the future. Furthermore, the General
Assembly removed language from the OGCA that formerly directed the
COGCC to regulate the “balanced development” of oil and gas. 68
Correlative rights certainly continue to exist in Colorado but the newly
amended OGCA evinces a legislative intent to trade the “balanced”
development of geological formations for a scheme less concerned with
even development of the reservoir.
Moreover, the General Assembly, through the OGCA and LUEA, invites
“patchwork” regulation. The OGCA now mandates that an operator must
file an application with the local government for a surface application to
drill before a drilling permit will be issued from the state. 69 And, the
OGCA goes on to expressly empower local governments with “regulatory
authority over oil and gas development” and authorizes local entities to
make regulations that are “more protective or stricter than state
requirements.” Notably, the OGCA is silent as to whether or not a local
entity may be less protective than state requirements.
The rights of local governments, historically defeated in the arena, are
further vindicated by the LUEA which now contemplates the regulation and
siting of oil and gas well locations as areas of local interest. 70 The sum of
OGCA and LUEA is a legislative scheme that completely disregards
uniformity. Although the OGCA begins with a legislative declaration that
the COGCC shall be directed to “regulate the development and production
of the natural resources of oil and gas in the State of Colorado,” an
inference that this calls for uniformity of regulation is weak. Much like the
use of the word “comprehensive” in the Sex Offender statute considered in
Ryals, this alone will not be enough for the Colorado Supreme Court. By
enacting The Bill, the General Assembly divorced the OGCA from its
anchor to uniformity – balanced development of the reservoir – and invited
a multitude of diverse regulations across the Denver Julesburg. If the
Colorado Supreme Court were to revisit uniformity of oil and gas
67. COLO REV. STAT. § 34-60-103 (2019).
68. COLO REV. STAT. § 34-60-102, amended by S.B. 19-181, 72d Gen. Assemb., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019).
69. COLO REV. STAT. § 34-60-106 (2019).
70. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 29-20-102 to 107 (2019).
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regulations using a mechanistic approach, it would likely determine the
uniformity factor now weighs in favor of the local entity.
2. Factor Two, Extraterritorial Impact
The need for extraterritorial impact factor in the court’s analysis is made
evident by the language in Article XX § 6 which limits the scope of local
law to the cities themselves.71 Extraterritorial impact is defined as “a ripple
effect that impacts state residents” outside the local entity in a manner that
has serious consequences amounting to more than merely incidental or de
minimus impacts.72 However, the actual application of the extraterritorial
impact often cuts against the local entity. 73 Despite the rule’s cautionary
qualification that extraterritorial consequences of a merely incidental nature
will not weigh against the local entity, courts will often apply this in a
manner that undercuts or redefines the importance of this qualification. 74
For example, in City of Northglenn v. Ibrarra, the Colorado Supreme
Court considered the extraterritorial impact of a Northglenn law that limited
the placement of juvenile sex offenders in foster homes within
Northglenn.75 The Colorado Supreme Court held the ordinance possessed
an impermissible ripple effect because it would decrease available housing
for adolescent sex offenders throughout the state. 76 Decrease in overall
housing in the state for adolescent sex offenders amounted to more than a
merely incidental impact.77 Ibrarra’s characterization of the ordinance as
having an extraterritorial impact is therefore instructive in determining how
little courts will require to find that an ordinance, while applicable only in
the city itself, actually has an extraterritorial nature.
Extraterritorial impact analysis presents an additional wrinkle: the
domino effect. After reading a court’s discussion of the domino effect, the
reader may experience a distinct impression of déjà vu because the
boundaries between the uniformity and extraterritorial factors are often
blurred. Application of this rule will sometimes revisit a concept already

71. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.
72. City of Northglenn v. Ibrarra, 62 P.3d 151, 161 (Colo. 2003).
73. See generally Laurie Reynolds, Home Rule, Extraterritorial Impact, and The
Region, 86 DENV. U.L. REV. 1271 (2009) (arguing modern extraterritorial impact analysis
restricts the scope of home rule powers).
74. Id. at 1278.
75. City of Northglenn v. Ibrarra, 62 P.3d 151, 153 (Colo. 2003).
76. Id. at 161.
77. Id. at 161.
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considered by the court in the uniformity factor: patchwork regulations. 78
When the Colorado Supreme Court discussed Ibrarra in Ryals, the
Colorado Supreme Court placed special emphasis on the “domino effects”
of the ordinance.79 The Colorado Supreme Court noted the ordinance
threatened to breed patchwork regulations – an indication the issue may be
of statewide or mixed concern. 80 Under the uniformity analysis, patchwork
regulations are indicative of a statewide or mixed issue if the General
Assembly evinced some intent to avoid the same. In the extraterritorial
analysis however, the intent of the General Assembly does not appear to be
as dispositive. Instead, the court will look to see if the nature of the
ordinance would be likely to encourage other local entities to adopt similar
laws.81
Consideration of patchwork regulation under both factors is therefore
capable of producing confounding results. For purposes of the uniformity
test, a local law may be deemed to permissibly produce patchwork
regulations because the General Assembly did not express a desire to avoid
such results. This same law, under the extraterritoriality factor, will almost
certainly be treated as impermissibly triggering patchwork regulations even
though the General Assembly expressed no desire to avoid patchwork
regulations. The treatment of patchwork regulations under extraterritorial
impact analysis therefore subverts the promise of Article XX § 6 by
threatening to foreclose local regulation of a matter even if the State has not
expressed an interest in avoiding patchwork regulation of the issue. The
rights enumerated to local cities and towns under Article XX § 6 were not
granted conditionally on whether or not a local regulation might be
followed by other cities. Colorado’s adoption of a home rule scheme
reflects a policy choice to hazard patchworks of local regulatory schemes
not forbidden, expressly or impliedly, by the General Assembly.
In the oil and gas context, application of the extraterritoriality factor
consistently cuts against the local entity. 82 However, the calculus the
Supreme Court of Colorado has employed to reach this conclusion varies.
In Voss v. Lundvall Bros., the court held Greeley’s ordinances restricting oil
78. City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 581 (Colo. 2016);
Reynolds, supra note 73, at 1278.
79. Ryals v. City of Englewood, 364 P.3d 900, 907 (Colo. 2016).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 586, 591 (Colo. 2016);
Longmont, 369 P.3d at 580; City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 586,
591 (Colo. 2016); Voss v. Lundvall Bros., 830 P.2d 1061, 1067 (Colo. 1992).
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and gas development possessed an impermissible extraterritorial effect
because the uneven development of oil and gas along geological formations
would result in increased production costs for operators and inequitable
distributions of royalty payments to mineral owners in contravention of the
OGCA.83 Voss therefore relied on an interpretation of relevant state law and
the impact the ordinance would have on persons outside city limits. In City
of Longmont v. Colorado Oil and Gas Association, the Colorado Supreme
Court drew from their opinion in Voss but added in the domino effect
wrinkle of Ibarra.84 Longmont held that the environmentally restrictive
ordinance might encourage other cities to follow suit. 85
Had the Colorado Supreme Court limited their analysis of the
extraterritorial impact factor simply by affirming Voss, the court would
have arrived at the same conclusion – that the ordinance possessed an
extraterritorial impact. Yet, critically, Longmont introduces a new, almost
impossible hurdle for local entities by applying the domino effect wrinkle.
For Longmont, this additional wrinkle is not dispositive but for other cases
it may be significant. If the Colorado Supreme Court considers local
regulations of oil and gas reaching beyond the scope of the amended
OGCA, the local entity will almost certainly lose on the extraterritoriality
factor under the Longmont approach. However, if the Colorado Supreme
Court returns to its analysis in Voss, the local ordinance is less likely to be
characterized as pertaining to an issue of mixed or statewide concern
because the analysis of the court will be limited to considering the OGCA
and consequences of the ordinance to persons outside the local boundaries.
In Voss and Longmont, the Court held the local ordinance to be in
contravention of the OGCA due to its disregard of mineral interest owners.
The newly amended OGCA divorces itself from these same concerns by
shifting to a legislative scheme more concerned with the protection of
health, safety, and the environment than the equitable treatment of mineral
interest owners.86 This does not mean, however, that new language in the
OGCA will not lend itself towards characterization of the ordinance as
possessing extraterritorial impacts. Depending on the nature of the local
ordinance, the Colorado Supreme Court might view the regulation as
jeopardizing “public health, safety, and welfare” of persons and wildlife
outside the boundaries of the local entity. 87 On the other hand, certain local
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Voss, 830 P.2d at 1067.
Longmont, 369 P.3d at 581.
Id.
COLO REV. STAT. § 34-60-102 to 103 (2019).
COLO REV. STAT. § 34-60-102 (2019).
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regulations of oil and gas may not be deemed to be of an extraterritorial
nature.
To sum this all up, a challenged ordinance regulating oil and gas will
likely be treated as possessing an extraterritorial impact if it is viewed under
the same lens as Longmont. However, if the ordinance is treated in the same
vein as the ordinance in Voss, the nature of the ordinance and language of
the statute will be dispositive. An ordinance yielding results contrary to the
safety, health, and environmental aims of the OGCA would almost certainly
be deemed as being extraterritorial in nature. However, an ordinance that
tracks the language of the OGCA will most likely not have an
extraterritorial impact under the Voss framework.
3. Factor Three, Traditional Regulation
The third factor in determining whether an issue is of statewide or local
concern looks to historical regulation of the issue by state and local
authorities. 88 This analysis is centered around a desire to adequately
preserve regulation of the matter by traditional authorities. In Voss, the
Colorado Supreme Court held that the issue of oil and gas regulation is a
matter traditionally governed by state authorities. 89 In their discussion of the
issue, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that because the General
Assembly created the COGCC, issues of Oil and Gas regulation constituted
a matter of statewide concern. Later, in Longmont and Fort Collins, the
Colorado Supreme Court revisited their reasoning in Voss and concluded
the regulation of oil and gas instead constituted a matter traditionally
regulated by both state and local authorities.90 Longmont and Fort Collins
repudiated Voss in this regard because the Colorado Supreme Court
recognized the regulation of oil and gas is governed by the COGCC as well
as municipalities with zoning authority. 91 So, even before the General
Assembly amended the OGCA, the third factor cut both ways. Under the
old paradigm, the law recognized regulation of oil and gas as an area of law
traditionally regulated by both state and local governments.
The newly amended OGCA “provide[s] broad authority to local
governments to plan for and regulate the use of land”. 92 However, the
General Assembly was careful not to express a policy too munificent. Their
88. Voss, 830 P.2d at 1067.
89. Id. at 1068.
90. City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 586, 591 (Colo. 2016);
Longmont, 369 P.3d at 581.
91. Longmont, 369 P.3d at 581.
92. COLO REV. STAT. § 29-20-102(1) (2019).
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grant to local governments came with a caveat: “nothing in this article shall
serve to diminish the planning functions of the state or the duties of the
division of planning.”93 Thus, the policy of the new OGCA affirms the
traditional status quo and recognizes a system of dual regulation by both
local and state governments. There is no reason, then, for the traditional
factor analysis in Longmont and Fort Collins to be disturbed by new
legislation. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded, in 2016, that the
regulation of oil and gas is a matter of both state and local concern. There is
little reason to think that legislative developments disturbed this portion of
the analysis in Longmont and Fort Collins.
4. Factor Four, Colorado Constitution
The final step of Colorado preemption analysis looks to whether the
Colorado Constitution commits regulation of the matter to either state or
local authorities. 94 At first glance, this may seem simple enough: the
Colorado Constitution either says or doesn’t say a matter is reserved for
state or local authorities. In reality, the Colorado Supreme Court’s analysis
of this factor fails to produce clear and bright line results. Confusion on this
point is attributed to the “inherent tension” at play “between competing
constitutional and statutory provisions.” 95 On one hand, home rule
provisions in Article XX § 6 of the Colorado Constitution grant local
authorities with broad land use control. 96 On the other hand, the OGCA
reserves certain powers over oil and gas regulation to the state. Conflict
between these competing areas should be resolved in favor of towns and
cities because the General Assembly is restricted from legislatively
depriving a right contained within the Colorado Constitution. 97 Despite
these constitutional provisions, the Colorado Supreme Court tends to weigh
this factor in favor of the state. 98
Ibrarra and Voss provide some explanation as to why this fourth factor is
so onerous for local entities. Ibrarra noted that while home rule powers in
Article XX § 6 are broad, the constitution does not expressly provide for

93. Id.
94. City of Northglenn v. Ibrarra, 62 P.3d 151, 162 (Colo. 2003).
95. Kevin J. Duffy, Regulating Hydraulic Fracturing Through Land Use: State
Preemption Prevails, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 817, 846 (2014).
96. Minor, supra note 31, at 90.
97. Duffy, supra note 95, at 846.
98. See Ibrarra, 62 P.3d at 162; see also Voss v. Lundvall Bros., 830 P.2d 1061, 1067
(Colo. 1992).
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local regulation over oil and gas.99 This silence, therefore, means the fourth
factor weighs in favor of the state. Similarly, Voss reasoned that local
entities enjoyed constitutional power to regulate land-use but this
constitutional power yielded to state goals expressed in state legislation. 100
Sometime after Voss and Ibrarra, in 2008, Telluride v. San Miguel
Valley signified a change in reasoning for the court.101 Although the
Colorado Supreme Court did not expressly overturn Ibrarra or Voss, the
reasoning employed in Telluride represents a massive departure in the
court’s constitutional analysis. In Voss, the court limited the scope of
Article XX home rule powers to better conform the actions of home-rule
municipalities to the mandates of the General Assembly. 102 Corporate
challengers to the city of Telluride’s home rule authorities patterned their
argument from the logic in Voss: Article XX should be constrained by acts
of the General Assembly, the corporate challenger in Telluride contended.
Telluride rejected this argument, repudiating the logic of Voss. Plainly,
Telluride announced that “the legislature cannot prohibit the exercise of
constitutional home rule powers, regardless of the state interests which may
be implicated by the exercise of those powers.”103 So, where the actions of
the municipality concern matters of local issues, the legislative acts of the
General Assembly are preempted by Article XX and the ordinances of the
municipality.
Telluride went one step further. Ibrarra announced tiers of importance
interpreting Article XX. If Article XX did not explicitly enumerate a
municipal power, Voss stated, then Article XX could not be said to directly
address the matter for purposes of constitutional preemption analysis. 104
The corporate challenger in Telluride argued that tiers of condemnation
power existed in Article XX – those express and implied. 105 Telluride
refused this argument too, “we reject the notion that there are two separate
echelons of condemnation powers under Article XX”. 106 Of course,
questions remain as to how this piece of Telluride should be interpreted.
Does this mean that there are no echelons of implied and express powers in
Article XX or did Telluride speak only to powers of condemnation
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Ibrarra, 62 P.3d at 162.
Voss, 830 P.2d at 1068.
See Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161 (Colo. 2008).
Voss, 830 P.2d at 1068.
Telluride, 185 P.3d at 170.
Ibrarra, 62 P.3d at 162.
Telluride, 185 P.3d at 170.
Id.
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enumerated in Article XX? Article XX § 6 makes no explicit mention of
condemnation powers.107 This lends credence to the argument that Telluride
dispelled the notion that any categories of express or implied powers exist
in Article XX. So long as the power is deemed to be local through a
preemption analysis, it should then be protected by Article XX and is
beyond the purview of legislative interference.
Interestingly, however, it would seem that the impacts of Telluride have
been cabined to the realm of Article XX jurisprudence only as it pertains to
condemnation authority. In Longmont, the Colorado Supreme Court’s
discussion of the fourth factor made no mention of Telluride.108 Instead, the
Colorado Supreme Court reaffirmed Voss. Puzzlingly, the Colorado
Supreme Court was reticent to explain why; simply stating the Constitution
makes no explicit mention of fracking. 109 Therefore, the fourth factor
cannot weigh in favor of either the state or the city. 110
Distillation of this fourth factor in preemption jurisprudence produces a
schizophrenic framework. First, the General Assembly is prohibited from
legislating away powers given to home-rule municipalities regardless of
whether or not those powers are expressly enumerated by Article XX. This
means little, however, because the fourth factor of preemption analysis
permits the judiciary to apply in reasoning what it says is forbidden: look to
whether a matter is expressly stated in Article XX. So, if the court applies
all four factors and determines a matter is of a local character, the General
Assembly is prohibited from legislating away that power regardless of
whether the power is expressly listed in Article XX. Nevertheless, a matter
of a purportedly local character, not expressly listed in Article XX, is less
likely to receive the protection of Telluride because the fourth factor is
squarely at odds with the basic concept that legislative acts shall not divest
municipalities of their constitutional powers.
All of this does not mean that courts should dispense of the fourth factor
test altogether. It is still crucial to determine whether or not the Colorado
Constitution commits a matter to state or local authority. However, many
issues of a local character are not expressly listed by Article XX because
Article XX was not intended to serve as a narrow or exhaustive list of local
powers.111 The fourth factor test should then be modified with a corollary: if
the Colorado Constitution is silent as to the governance of the matter, can it
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.
See City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573 (Colo. 2016).
Id. at 581.
Id.
COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.
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be inferred that the issue belongs to the powers broadly enumerated in
Article XX § 6? If so, the fourth factor should weigh in favor of the
municipality.
Current application of the court’s fourth factor test should not, in theory,
hinge in anyway on legislative developments of the General Assembly.
Voss, however, informs that the courts will weigh the fourth factor as
cutting neither in favor of the municipality or state if the matter is not
expressly listed in Article XX and the General Assembly speaks on the
matter. It is likely then that if the Colorado Supreme Court were to
readdress the oil and gas preemption analysis in light of amendments to the
OGCA, it would not depart from previous holdings. The fourth factor
would then weigh neither in favor of the state or the home rule city.
5. Applying all Four Factors
Under the new OGCA, it is now possible for a municipality to enter the
colosseum and successfully argue the regulation of oil and gas concerns a
purely local matter. If oil and gas is deemed to be a local matter, home rule
cities intent on regulating oil and gas in a manner less restrictive than state
law will be able to do so. The uniformity factor likely now weights in favor
of the local entity. The traditional analysis and constitutional factors will
likely continue to cut both ways as they did before the Bill. Lastly,
application of the extraterritorial factor will be especially sensitive to the
nature of the local ordinance. Before The Bill, courts used the correlative
rights of mineral owners and the health of the reservoir as the logical
underpinnings to support reasoning that the regulation of oil and gas
produced extraterritorial impacts. The Bill now expressly authorizes
municipalities to regulate oil and gas in a manner more restrictive than state
law. The new OGCA, therefore, prioritizes the health and safety concerns
of municipal governments over more traditional concerns regarding
extraterritorial impact of oil and gas regulation. When courts reanalyze the
extraterritorial impact of oil and gas regulation they will either reason this
factor weighs in favor of the local entity or draw on the new language of the
OGCA to conclude new extraterritorial impact results from a local oil and
gas regulation.
It must be reiterated that Colorado preemption jurisprudence is
mercurial.112 While projections taken from a mechanical extrapolation of
existing jurisprudence are alluring, they provide little guarantees. If the
court characterizes the local regulation as being of a local concern, the
112. See Kramer, supra note 49, at 43.
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analysis ends. A local entity’s law will supersede state law if the matter is
characterized as a local concern.113 It is possible that a court could deem oil
and gas to be a local concern and painlessly resolve the dispute in favor of
the local entity. If, however, the regulation is characterized as an issue of
state or mixed concern, the court is required to determine whether the local
regulation is expressly, impliedly, or operationally preempted by state
law. 114 In previous oil and gas preemption cases, the Colorado Supreme
Court held the OGCA did not expressly or impliedly preempt the efforts of
local entities to prohibitively regulate matters of mixed state and local
concern.115 Instead, the court held local regulations were operationally
preempted by state law.116 It is therefore necessary to consider the second,
distinct test of Colorado preemption analysis: conflict analysis.
D. Conflict Preemption Analysis
The launching point for preemption analysis of county and statutory city
regulations begins with conflict preemption analysis. 117 This is also the
second, conditional step for home rule city regulations pertaining to matters
of statewide or mixed concern.118 There are three ways a local law may be
preempted: expressly, operationally, or impliedly. 119 Express preemption
occurs when the General Assembly expressly preempts the local law. 120
Implied preemption exists where a state law broadly addresses a particular
issue in such a thorough manner that it implicitly preempts local laws. 121
Operational preemption is a peculiar animal. “Mere overlap in subject
matter” of state and local law “is not sufficient” to preempt the local law. 122
For the local law to be operationally preempted, the local law must
materially impede or destroy a state interest. 123

113. Longmont, 369 P.3d at 579.
114. Id. at 581.
115. Longmont, 369 P.3d at 581; Voss v. Lundvall Bros., 830 P.2d 1061, 1066 (Colo.
1992).
116. Longmont, 369 P.3d at 581; Voss, 830 P.2d at 1066.
117. Colo. Mining Ass’n. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Summit County, 199 P.3d 718, 723
(Colo. 2009).
118. Longmont, 369 P.3d 573, 581.
119. Kramer, supra note 49, at 38.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Ray v. City & County of Denver, 121 P.2d 886, 888 (Colo. 1942).
123. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., 830 P.2d 1045, 1059 (Colo.
1992).
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The Colorado Supreme Court has consistently held express and implied
preemption are not at play when considering preemption analysis in the
context of oil and gas preemption. 124 Given the nature of changes to the
OGCA – granting more control to local entities – it seems unlikely the new
OGCA will be held to expressly or impliedly preempt local ordinances
regulating oil and gas.125 However, this does not mean that the OGCA
could be further amended to expressly preempt certain local oil and gas
regulations. Weld County’s attempt to wrest power from the hands of the
COGCC and assume all authority over the siting of oil and gas wells
prompted some lawmakers to reconsider the language of the OGCA. On
January 15, 2020, lawmakers introduced HB 20-1126.126 HB 20-1126
offered to amend language in the OGCA regarding the siting of oil and gas
wells. As the OGCA and LUEA are currently written, only applicable local
entities possess the authority to approve or deny permits for surface well
locations.127 HB 20-1126 threatened to qualify this power by stating all
surface well location permits are subject to approval by the director of the
COGCC.128 If HB 20-1126 became law, it would expressly foreclose Weld
County’s ambitions to act as the sole authority for approval of surface
location permits. Given current trends in Colorado politics, it seemed
probable HB 20-1126 would become law. Surprisingly, however, on March
2, 2020, the House Committee on Energy and Environment postponed the
bill indefinitely.129
The short-lived existence of HB 20-1126 underscores just how easily the
state could divest oil and gas regulatory powers from statutory entities and
home rule counties through express preemption. Dissimilarly, home rule
cities are relatively more immune to threats of express preemption. In
Telluride, the Colorado Supreme Court invalidated a land use statute as it
impermissibly deprived the home rule city of home rule powers conferred
by Article XX. 130

124. City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 586, 592 (Colo. 2016); City
of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 583 (Colo. 2016); Voss v. Lundvall
Bros., 830 P.2d 1061, 1066 (Colo. 1992); Bowen/Edwards Assocs., 830 P.2d 1045 (Colo.
1992).
125. See COLO REV. STAT. § 24-65.1-101 (2019); COLO REV. STAT. § 34-60-131 (2019).
126. H.B. 20-1126, 72nd Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2020).
127. COLO REV. STAT. § 29-20-104 (2019).
128. H.B. 20-1126, 72nd Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2020).
129. COLO. GEN. ASSEMB., LOCAL CONTROL APPROVALS OIL AND GAS APPLICATIONS,
https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/hb20-1126 (last visited Apr. 7, 2020).
130. Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 169 (Colo. 2008).
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Implied preemption exists when the scope of the statute demonstrates a
legislative intent of the state to “completely occupy a field to the exclusion
of all other regulation.”131 The term implied generally inspires thoughts of
clever litigators who manage to conjure up novel purposes for a statute. The
threshold for implied preemption is higher than the term suggests. Indeed,
“mere overlap in subject matter is not sufficient to void a local
ordinance.”132 In Bowen/Edwards, the court rejected an invitation to
construe the OGCA as impliedly preempting local regulatory efforts.133 As
the newest iteration of the OGCA contemplates even more local regulatory
involvement, it is not plausible to think the Colorado Supreme Court would
disturb the reasoning of Bowen/Edwards.
In the home rule battles of the Denver Julesberg, operational preemption
is most often responsible for ending the local regulation. 134 An operational
conflict is implicated when the local regulation “materially impede[s] or
destroy[s] a state interest.” In Fort Collins, the city instituted a lengthy
moratorium on fracking. 135 This moratorium infringed on the clear interest
of the state in promoting efficient, responsible, and uniform development of
oil and gas resources.136 For similar reasons, the moratorium in Longmont
also failed to survive an operational preemption analysis.137
Fort Collins placed emphasis on the state’s interest in promoting
responsible and balanced development of oil and gas. 138 Since Fort Collins,
the terms responsible and balanced have been stricken. 139 Now, oil and gas
pools are intended to produce “up to [a] maximum efficient rate of
production, subject to the protection of public health, safety, and welfare,
the environment, and wildlife resources.” 140 So, moratoriums that were
once considered operationally preempted by state law are now in harmony.
131. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., 830 P.2d 1045, 1058 (Colo.
1992).
132. Colo. Mining Ass’n. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Summit County, 199 P.3d 718, 724
(Colo. 2009).
133. Bowen/Edwards, 830 P.2d 1045, 1059.
134. See City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 586 (Colo. 2016); City
of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573 (Colo. 2016); 60 P.3d 758; Voss v.
Lundvall Bros., 830 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1992).
135. Fort Collins, 369 P.3d at 589.
136. Id. at 593.
137. Longmont, 369 P.3d at 585.
138. Fort Collins, 369 P.3d at 593.
139. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(I), amended by S.B. 19-181, 72d Gen. Assemb., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Colo 2019).
140. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(b) (2019).
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In Ryals, the Colorado Supreme Court answered a certified question
from the Tenth Circuit as to whether a city ordinance was preempted by
state law.141 The Colorado Supreme Court reasoned residency restrictions
imposed on sex offenders were a matter of mixed state and local concern. 142
Nevertheless, the court went on, the ordinance was not in operational
conflict with state law. 143 To begin, nothing in Colorado’s state sex offender
scheme “prevents home-rule cities from banning sex offenders from
residing within city limits.”144 The challenger to the ordinance grasped at a
state provision requiring state officers to approve sex offenders’ new
residences.145 This state provision, the challenger asserted, qualified as a
conflict between state law and the ordinance. 146
Finding an operational conflict, however, is not a game of statutory
‘Where’s Waldo’. Ryals explains that merely pointing out a state law on the
matter is not sufficient to conclude operational preemption. Real friction,
not fictional friction, must exist. Ryals points out that the friction here is
fictional: “[s]tate approval of a sex offender’s application does not imply
that a city must approve it. On the contrary, state approval is but one
prerequisite to relocating…[t]hus, state law on the subject of sex offender
registry recognizes that local ordinances play an important role in
determining residency.”147 The ordinance in Ryals does not defeat the
purpose of state law nor does it grind against operation of state law, it
merely serves to locally supplement an area of state law.
Operational or conflict preemption is no ‘Where’s Waldo’ exercise but it
is not nearly as rigorous as the meandering test of matter characterization
for home rule cities. The test is straight forward: does the home rule city’s
law authorize what state law forbids, or prohibit what is authorized? 148
Clearly, then, any effort taken by a county or statutory city to defeat state
regulations would be operationally preempted. However, local entities may
have room to creatively and exclusively exercise authority as it pertains to
surface location permitting and land disturbance issues. Under the OGCA,
local entities are granted the authority to plan for and regulate the location

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Ryals v. City of Englewood, 364 P.3d 900, 903 (Colo. 2016).
Id. at 908.
Id. at 909.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
City of Commerce City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1284 (Colo. 2002).
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and siting of oil and gas wells. 149 Nevertheless, pursuant to Weld County’s
Memorandum of Understanding with the COGCC, Weld County agreed to
cede surface permitting authority to the COGCC.150 Weld County has not
flourished as a result of the Bill or the Memorandum of Understanding.
Permit approvals are down by over 50% since the Bill became effective
and, as a result, Weld County will lose out on millions in tax revenue. 151
So, why would Weld County agree to this Memorandum of
Understanding? While Weld County now possesses the sole power to
approve surface permits to drill, the COGCC retained the power to approve
permits to drill. Therefore, an operator seeking to drill in Weld County
would still be required to obtain approval from the County for the surface
location of the well and the State for the actual drilling of the well. Thus,
operators and Weld County are still required to go through the State in
order to bring a well to completion. Furthermore, as evidenced by the
introduction and tabling of HB 20-1126, it would not be terribly difficult
for the General Assembly to simply amend the OGCA and essentially
codify the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding. So, Weld County
can try and expedite surface permitting for operators but this means very
little if the COGCC does not promptly respond to applications for permits
to drill.
III. Oklahoma
Oklahoma, like Colorado, is an imperium in imperio state.152 Oklahoma
and Colorado share similar constitutional DNA as Article XVIII of the
Oklahoma Constitution provides a basis for home rule municipal
authority. 153 Under Article XVIII, “a city charter supersedes conflicting
state law on matters of purely municipal concern.”154 So, like Colorado, an
Oklahoma home rule city may enact ordinances that supersede state law
149. COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-20-104.
150. COLO. OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, COGCC ESTABLISHES PERMITTING
PROTOCOL FOR 1041 AREAS DESIGNATED OF STATE SPECIAL INTEREST FOR OIL AND GAS
DEVELOPMENT (Sept. 4, 2019).
151. Joe St. George, Decreasing Oil and Gas Permits Impacting Weld County
Businesses, Local Governments, FOX DEN. (Dec. 9, 2019, 6:56 PM), https://kdvr.com/news/
problem-solvers/decreasing-oil-and-gas-permits-impacting-weld-county-businesses-localgovernments/.
152. Polley, supra note 3, at 278.
153. OKLA. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3; State ex rel. Trimble v. City of Moore, 818 P.2d 889,
898 (Okla. 1991).
154. Moore, 818 P.2d 889, 898 (Okla. 1991).
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when those laws pertain to a purely municipal concern. The similarities
continue. Since 1934 and for years thereafter, a number of Oklahoma
litigants invoked Article XVIII authority in an attempt to hoist local law
above state law and curb oil and gas development. 155 Moreover, the
Oklahoma Legislature, like the Colorado General Assembly, recently felt
compelled by oil and gas home rule litigation to legislate on the issue. 156
Dive deeper into the Oklahoma and Colorado home rule sagas, however,
and dissimilarities begin to appear. The guiding case in Oklahoma for home
rule preemption in the context of oil and gas is a 1934 Oklahoma Supreme
Court Case, Beveridge v. Harper & Turner Oil Trust.157 There, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a local ordinance may validly restrict
an otherwise lawful oil and gas operation if the local ordinance
circumscribes a private property use that is “inconsistent with the
promotion of the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the
community.” In Beveridge, four factors are relevant: character of
improvements on the property; proximity to other improved property; the
possible and probable effect of oil development on the area as it is now
situated; and its probable effect on the future growth and development of
the city.158 The Oklahoma test, therefore, does not engage in the same
characterization factors as Colorado. Instead, Oklahoma courts will look to
factors relevant to the location of the operations, the purpose of the
restriction, and the characteristics of the locale. 159 Arguably, administration
of this simpler Oklahoma test produces more favorable results for local
entities than the Colorado test. For instance, Beveridge held that zoning
prohibitions on the development of oil and gas in Oklahoma City were
valid.160
Since 1934, however, a number of legal developments eroded hope that
Beveridge would serve as an environmental sword against oil and gas
155. See Clouser v. City of Norman, 393 P.2d 827 (Okla. 1964); Beveridge v. Harper &
Turner Oil Trust, 35 P.2d 435 (Okla. 1934) (overruled on other grounds); Supplemental
Report of the Administrative Law Judge, I-MAC Petroleum Services, Inc., Okla. Corp.
Comm’n, Cause PD No. 200900255-O/T (Mar. 3, 2010).
156. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 137.1 (2015).
157. See Beveridge, 35 P.2d 435.
158. Id. at 440.
159. Id. at 440.
160. Compare Beveridge, 35 P.2d 435 (holding the special nature of municipal area
justified zoning restrictions on drilling), with Voss v. Lundvall Bros., 830 P.2d 1061, 1066
(Colo. 1992) (holding wider state interests and effects of ordinance could not yield to
municipal regulation), and City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 586
(Colo. 2016) (same).
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development in municipalities. Three decades after Beveridge, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court revisited the issue in Clouser.161 In Clouser, the
city of Norman zoned plaintiff lessor’s acreage to restrict oil and gas
development on the premises. 162 The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that
this was an impermissible exercise of local power as the factors implicated
in Beveridge were not present in Clouser.163 Unlike the valid Oklahoma
City zoning prohibition on drilling, the Norman prohibition was arbitrary,
Clouser reasoned, because the prohibition extended to an area not densely
populated.164
Moreover, the area was generally unimproved and,
furthermore, oil and gas development “could not affect other areas nor
could it affect the future development of the city.”165 Clouser’s succinct
application of the Beveridge factors severely limited the potential scope and
punch Beveridge may have possessed when it was first decided.
Many decades after Beveridge and Clouser, in 2015, the Oklahoma
Legislature directly addressed the issue of oil and gas regulation by local
entities. 166 Title 52 § 137.1 authorizes a local entity to establish reasonable
setbacks and fencing requirements but expressly prohibits a local entity
from “effectively prohibit[ing] or ban[ning] any oil and gas operations.”167
Moreover, §137.1 provides, “all other regulations of oil and gas operations
shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the [Oklahoma] Corporation
Commission”. 168 The effect of §137.1 is succinctly described by the
legislative history of the law. An Oklahoma Committee Report on the bill,
later codified as §137.1, describes it as “prohibiting regulation by local
entities.”169 Shortly after the passage of §137.1, the Oklahoma Attorney
General issued an opinion on the effect of the bill. The regulation of oil and
gas is a statewide concern, the opinion explained, because the oil and gas
industry is crucial to the Oklahoma economy and concerns a great number
of Oklahomans across the state.170 As the regulation of oil and gas is now
designated as an issue of statewide concern, the effect of §137.1 is to

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Clouser, 393 P.2d 827.
Id. at 828.
Id. at 830.
Id.
Id.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 137.1 (2015).
Id.
Id.
SB 80-9, 55th Legis., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2015).
Okla. Att’y General Op. No. 2015-12, 2015 WL 7873263 (Nov. 30, 2015).
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preempt prohibitive local regulation of both chartered and non-chartered
cities.171
So, while the Colorado General Assembly vested local entities with more
authority to prohibitively regulate the oil and gas industry, the Oklahoma
Legislature expressly preempted local entities from effectively banning the
production of oil and gas. The comparison of the Colorado and Oklahoma
approaches sheds light on the proper place of federalism and home rule in
the context of oil and gas regulation.
From an industry perspective, legislative developments in Oklahoma are
a huge win. The Oklahoma Legislature shut the door to the sort of litigation
the Colorado Supreme Court entertained in the past three decades.
Conversely, legislative developments in Colorado restrain the industry with
a myriad of new regulations. No doubt, the new OGCA is a win for
environmentalists in Colorado. At first glance, the take-away from these
two cases may suggest that the implementation of home rule regulation
favors environmentalist movements and impedes the oil industry.
This conclusion, however, is reductive. First, it isn’t entirely appropriate
to characterize the novel versions of the LUEA or the OGCA as pro-home
rule or federalist. More accurately, the amended OGCA endeavors to
empower local entities only to act more prohibitively than what is mandated
by the state. 172 Second, the authorities delegated to local entities in
Colorado are still subject to drilling permitting approval through the
COGCC.173 Crucially, the amended OGCA changed the composition of the
COGCC directors from individuals experienced in the industry to a
majority of individuals with little industry experience. 174 The COGCC is
now comprised of individuals concerned less with the industry and more
with health, safety, and the environment. Perhaps, partially as a result of
this change, the number of approved permits in Colorado has slowed
drastically.175
Practically speaking, Colorado is using the façade of federalism to
strangle the oil industry pursuant to the General Assembly’s objective of
diminishing industry in the state. The façade of federalism underlying The
Bill was necessary due to statewide voter sentiment regarding oil and
171. Id.
172. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-131 (2019) (“A local government’s regulations may be
more protective or stricter than state requirements.”).
173. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-106(18)(a) (2019).
174. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-104(2)(a)(I) (2019).
175. See David R. Little & Diana S. Prulhiere, Colorado, 5 OIL & GAS, NAT. RES. &
ENERGY J. 117 (2019).
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gas.176 Legislators couldn’t risk implementing an act transparently hostile to
the industry as Colorado voters soundly defeated an anti-oil and gas
proposition in 2018.177 The solution, then, was to try and utilize home rule
provisions in conjunction with COGCC changes to completely foreclose oil
and gas development in many counties and slow it in others. A true
federalist solution should serve the local needs of each community. The Bill
certainly does not do that.
Conversely, the Oklahoma Legislature acted very transparently. In no
uncertain terms, §137.1 directs the state to dominate the regulation of oil
and gas.178 Consistent with widespread trends across the country to reduce
local powers, §137.1 reduces the significance of Article XVIII powers. In
Colorado, such an act might be deemed unconstitutional under Telluride as
it may impermissibly divest local authorities of their constitutional
powers.179 Today, §137.1 represents a great legislative victory for the
industry.
In years to come, however, the industry may come to regret the violence
§137.1 has done to Article XVIII. If §137.1 is not considered
unconstitutional, what would stop the Oklahoma Legislature from
implementing statewide bans of oil and gas in the future? To many in
Oklahoma today, the prospect of such a dramatic change in state legislative
tides may seem unfathomable. Keep in mind, however, that the prospect of
anti-industry legislation in Colorado was not on the horizon in the 1980s.
As appealing as §137.1 may be today for the industry, it may, in the future,
be seen as a Faustian bargain.
Let’s unpack what this bargain entails. In sum, if the industry sticks with
§137.1, they gain the sword of state law and lose the shield of home rule
constitutional provisions. Through §137.1, the industry tethers its future
existence in Oklahoma to the State Legislature. So long as the state
legislature remains favorable to the industry, the industry continues to exist.
This is a big bet for the industry but, given the current political climate in
Oklahoma, probably safe one.
Home rule provisions in both Colorado and Oklahoma should be
faithfully defended by the courts.
The growing rift between
environmentalist urban areas and rural areas reliant on the oil industries can
176. Greg Avery, Voters Reject Oil Well Setbacks as Colorado’s Proposition 112
Defeated, DENVER BUS. JOURNAL (Nov. 6, 2018, 10:50 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/
denver/news/2018/11/06/colorado-prop-112-defeated.html.
177. Id.
178. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52 § 137.1 (2019).
179. See Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161 (Colo. 2008).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

764

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 5

be reconciled through true principles of federalism. Neither the amended
OGCA nor the provisions of §137.1 strike this balance. On one end,
urbanites in Denver and Boulder have deprived the people of Weld County
of economic prosperity. If Boulderites wish to restrict the oil and gas
industry in their own backyard, that is their prerogative. It is not their place
to halt oil development in Weld County and diminish an industry that has
provided generations of Coloradans with jobs and opportunities. Similarly,
§137.1 divests larger urban areas from regulating oil and gas in a manner
appropriate for a more populated region. The unintended consequence of
§137.1 may be to galvanize metropolitan Oklahomans against the industry
and deprive municipalities from making responsible, local regulations. The
solution to this problem is in the constitutions of both states: enact
legislation consistent with home rule provisions to give cities and counties
wide-ranging autonomy to regulate these issues.
IV. Conclusion
Today and for the past thirty years, the oil and gas preemption litigation
in Colorado exemplifies a growing rift among Coloradans. Since the 1970s,
oil and gas has been and continues to be an important part of the state
economy. 180 Not all of Colorado relies on oil and gas, however. As of
2014, 96% of oil production originated from five counties. 181 Many
Coloradans, most outside of producing counties, see oil and gas as an
antiquated and harmful industry. 182 From 2000 to 2018, Colorado has
gained over a million residents. 183 With this growth, Colorado’s economy
is becoming more diversified and the oil and gas industry is now one of
many industries in a broader economic profile. 184 The ultimate result is that
legislators and voters are pushing to change the oil and gas industry in
180. BUS. RES. DIV., COLORADO OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY : UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF
COLORADO OIL AND GAS PRICES, at 5 (Aug. 2015), https://www.colorado.edu/business/
sites/default/files/attached-files/colorado_oil_and_gas_update_-_prices_082015.pdf.
181. Id. at 3.
182. See generally, BUS. RES. DIV., supra note 180, at 4; Jon Murray, Proposition 112
Election Map: Anti-Fracking Measure Failed in Most Counties with Heavy Oil and Gas
Drilling, THE DENVER POST (Nov. 8, 2018, 2:15 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2018/
11/08/colorado-proposition-112-election-fracking-county-map/.
183. Population Totals for Colorado and Sub-State Regions, COLO. DEP’T OF LOCAL
AFF., https://demography.dola.colorado.gov/population/population-totals-colorado-substate/
#population-totals-for-colorado-and-sub-state-regions (last visited Apr. 7, 2020).
184. Industries, COLO. OFF. OF. ECON. DEV. & INT’L TRADE, https://choosecolorado.com/
key-industries/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2020).
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Colorado – even if it means oil and gas producing counties are casualties to
stricter regulations.
As of 2019, Colorado produced an average of 514,000 barrels of oil per
day. 185 In ad valorem taxes alone, the industry produces, on average, 350
million in taxes annually. 186 Colorado voters, too, seem to recognize the
importance of the industry. In 2018, Colorado voters defeated Proposition
112, an initiative designed to increase oil and gas setbacks to 2,500 feet
from things as ubiquitous as “irrigation canals” and as vague as “vulnerable
areas designated by state or a local government.” 187 While SB 19-181 is
vexing for the industry, Proposition 112 posed a much more menacing
threat to oil and gas development in Colorado.
For proponents of the oil and gas industry in Colorado, the future is
uncertain. The newly amended OGCA brings a new host of regulatory
hurdles to tackle. Regulatory challenges are not novel for the oil and gas
industry. In the past nine years, Colorado enacted fifteen different oil and
gas rulemakings.188 Nevertheless, the long string of new regulations do not
satisfy many political groups in Colorado. Colorado Rising, an
environmentalist group, is currently gathering steam to introduce six new
ballot initiatives contemplating the regulation of oil and gas. 189 Five of
these ballot proposals are “replicas or close cousins” of the defeated
Proposition 112.190 Employees and beneficiaries of the Colorado oil and gas
industry are caught playing a costly game of whack-a-mole. In order to
defeat Proposition 112, key Colorado producers donated more than 30
million dollars.191 No matter how well the industry lobbies in an election
185. Traywick, supra note 50.
186. COGA Fact Sheets, COLO. OIL & GAS ASS’N, https://www.coga.org/factsheets/
community-impact (last visited Apr. 7, 2020).
187. Colorado Proposition 112, Minimum Distance Requirements for New Oil, Gas, and
Fracking Projects Initiative (2018), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_
Proposition_112,_Minimum_Distance_Requirements_for_New_Oil,_Gas,_and_Fracking_Pr
ojects_Initiative_(2018).
188. COGA Fact Sheet: Regulatory Timeline, COLO. OIL & GAS ASS’ N (Oct. 4, 2019),
https://www.coga.org/factsheets/regulatory-timeline.
189. Sam Brasch, Despite Prop 112’s Loss, Colorado’s Fracking Foes are Back with 6
New Ballot Measures, COLO. PUB. RADIO NEWS (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.cpr.org/
2020/01/07/despite-prop-112s-loss-colorados-fracking-foes-are-back-with-6-new-ballotmeasures/.
190. Id.
191. Julie Turkewitz & Clifford Krauss, In Colorado, a Bitter Battle Over Oil, Gas and
the Environment Comes to a Head, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/10/23/us/colorado-fracking-proposition-112.html.
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cycle, it seems certain anti-industry proponents will be back the next cycle
to ask Colorado voters whether the industry needs to be limited.
A strong argument exists that the regulation of oil and gas is now a
purely local issue. The state has certainly not relinquished all power over
the regulation of oil and gas but the new OGCA is so local friendly that it
may tip the scales of a preemption analysis in favor of home rule entities
and permit a court to characterize regulation as a matter of purely local
concern. It is now probable that all four factors of operational preemption
analysis: uniformity, extraterritorial impact, traditional regulation, and
constitutional treatment tend to weigh more in favor of home rule
municipalities than the state. If the Colorado Supreme Court taps into the
same analytical vein as Telluride, the courts will almost certainly divest the
COGCC of some authority and cede home rule cities with the power to
regulate oil and gas.
When the General Assembly amended the OGCA, it did so under the
guise that it would afford local entities more control but only so long as that
control was used in a manner more restrictive than state law mandated. 192
Presumably, the intent of the OGCA was to resolve the sort of municipal
litigation seen in the past. More realistically, the amended OGCA forces
operators to contend with a balkanized landscape of state, city, and county
regulations.
Counties, both home rule and statutory, are largely at the mercy of state
law. Pro industry home-rule municipalities may be able to find some
optimism in the OGCA, however. New language in the OGCA may enable
home rule municipalities to govern oil and gas in a more industry friendly
manner than the state. Mechanical contours of preemption law can only
guide exploration of this issue so far – a key component of this area of
jurisprudence hinges on broad judicial discretion. 193 Given the growing rift
between regions in Colorado, it seems most appropriate to reserve the issue
of oil and gas regulation to federalism and permit home-rule cities to
govern in accordance with the Colorado Constitution.
In a passionate dissent in Community Communications, Justice
Rehnquist applauded the home rule movement as a key component of
federalism. 194 The Colorado home rule city of Boulder lost that case.
Boulder contended that it should, as a sovereign, enjoy the benefit of the

192. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-131.
193. See Kramer, supra note 49, at 43.
194. Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 70 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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state action exemption from liability of the Sherman Act.195 Justice
Rehnquist lamented, perhaps too hyperbolically, “the decision today
effectively destroys the ‘home rule’ movement in this country, through
which local governments have obtained, not without persistent state
opposition, a limited autonomy over matters of local concern.” 196 This
characterization of the fight was accurate but the prediction was not. Home
rule rights are certainly not dead. In fact, constitutional home rule
provisions remain as an important tool of federalism in imperium in imperio
states. The DJ Basin is calling, again, for combatants. Crucially, home rule
preemption litigation may now be restored as a promising weapon for local
entities. I like to think that Justice Rehnquist would be pleasantly surprised
to see home rule entities prepared to enter the fray to vindicate federalism
and the home rule movement.

195. Id. at 52.
196. Id. at 71.
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